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ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Dissertation: Computer Assisted Economic Modeling For 
Establishing Value-Based Tariffs. 
 
Degree:     MSc 
 
This dissertation examines the topic of port pricing and in particular develops and 
proposes a computer based model to assist ports wishing to adopt a value based 
wharfage tariff for cargoes transported in containers and as break-bulk. 
 
The proliferation of various types of ownership of ports around the world means that 
numerous and varied approaches are taken to address the issue of pricing for the 
services and facilities provided in ports.  As a consequence, UNCTAD has proposed 
an approach called the Cost-Performance-Value approach which seeks to enable 
ports to accurately develop tariffs for their various facilities and services irrespective 
of the overall type of ownership of the port.   
 
By focusing on the value aspect of this approach, the analysis conducted within this 
dissertation differentiates and identifies the value afforded to consignees of cargo 
transported in containers and in so doing develops a computer based model that gives 
a range within which a port may establish the wharfage tariff for the type of cargo 
trade.  The CIF value of the cargoes is used as a proxy or measurement of the level of 
value afforded to individual users of the port.  The lower end of the range allows 
ports to recover the annual depreciation expense of the berths whilst the upper end 
allows for a maximization of revenues. 
 
In analyzing and developing the computer model, statistics and data collected from 
the Saint Lucia Air and Sea Ports Authority which operates Port Castries in the 
island of St. Lucia, located in the Eastern Caribbean, is used.  
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1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  The Concept Of Logistics And Supply Chain Management 
 
In recent times the advent of Globalisation has had a profound impact on all aspects 
of trade and transportation.  Goods are no longer necessarily produced in one place 
but instead may consist of many individually manufactured components from various 
parts of the globe.  Consequently, manufacturers are now increasingly utilizing the 
concept of Logistics Management to better manage the global scope of their 
businesses.  As defined by the Council of Logistics Management, logistics 
management is  
the process of planning, implementing and controlling, the efficient, effective 
flow and storage of goods, services, and related information from point of 
origin to point of consumption for the purpose of conforming to customer 
requirements. (Lambert, Stock & Ellram 1998,3) 
 
Rather then viewing the manufacturing process as comprising separate and distinct 
components, modern managers must now take heed of what is termed the supply 
chain.  This chain follows closely the definition of logistics management described 
above, the aim of which is to provide the customer with value. 
 
As stated by Bergmann & Rawlings (1998), transport is a critical component of 
supply chain management since it creates value by providing time and place utility, 
ensuring that products are available when and where requested by customers. This 
means that transport within the supply chain encompasses all modes of sea, air and 
land transportation systems.  Consequently, integration of transport into the supply 
chain management allows managers to focus and make decisions on total supply 
chain costs rather than on incremental cost movements for individual functional 
areas. (Bergmann & Rawlings 1998). 
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1.2  Role Of Ports Within The Supply And Transport Chain 
Given the shift in focus to that of an integrated supply chain, ports now represent 
critical nodal points within that chain since the bulk of world trade is transported via 
the sea.  The importance of ports within the supply chain can easily be illustrated if 
one understands that a minimum of two ports is required for the effective operation 
of a sea transport activity.  Consequently, high levels of inefficiency or exorbitant 
port tariffs can impact negatively on the various supply chains both in terms of actual 
cost and time.  Alternatively, efficient and fairly priced ports can improve the supply 
chain.    
 
In recent times, faced with increased competition from other ports and forms of 
transportation, ports have responded by attempting to provide added value to their 
customers. In adopting such strategies, ports (knowingly or unknowingly) have 
further integrated themselves into the transport and supply chains.  No longer are 
ports simply nodes for the exchange of cargo from ships to other forms of transport.  
Instead they play an increasing role of processing/refining cargo within the port 
compounds prior to onward delivery.  Additionally, ports provide logistical solutions 
by acting as major distribution centres for multinational companies serving varied 
regions.  A classic example of this can be seen at the Port of Copenhagen, which acts 
as a major regional distribution centre for both UNICEF and Sony Co.  Numerous 
other examples abound around the world. 
 
Whilst ports have been slow to view themselves as part of the supply chain they 
nevertheless have made significant strides towards reduction of delays and the 
improvement of port operating systems.  Increasing levels of competition amongst 
ports coupled with technological advancements in shipping have in part caused these 
changes and have resulted in increasing the value added to the port users.   Aside 
from the improvements in technology and port operating systems, ports have begun 
to take a closer look at their pricing systems and its impact on the supply chain.   
 
 3
1.3  Port Pricing 
In seeking to provide services to its varied users ports incur costs that have to be 
recovered in one form or another.  However, the issue of its recovery is one that has 
produced much debate over the years because of the varied forms of ownership of 
ports around the world.  Based on the various forms of ownership, the services 
provided by the ports have been viewed at one extreme, as serving the general public 
economic interest whose costs should be paid through taxation and at the other 
extreme as a purely commercial venture which needs to recover its costs from the 
users of its services and facilities (Strandenes & Marlow 2000).  An overview of this 
debate will be provided in chapter 2. 
 
Emanating from this debate and with the increasing trend towards commercially 
oriented ports, agencies such as UNCTAD have attempted to provide ports with a 
method of cost recovery and pricing strategy suitable to varied forms of port 
ownership.  First proposed in 1975, UNCTAD advised ports to develop tariffs for 
their services based on three elements:  a) costs, to recover expenses incurred by the 
port in providing services and facilities;  b) utilization, to promote the better use of 
port assets; and  c) prices structured on what the traffic can bear (UNCTAD 1995).  
This approach is known as the Cost-Performance-Value approach.   They argued that 
use of this approach would not only allow for adequate recovery of the costs incurred 
in the delivery of the port services but at the same time allow ports to use pricing as a 
main tool to achieve their operational, financial and marketing objectives. 
 
1.3.1  Cost-Performance-Value Strategy 
The cost-performance-value strategy uses a mix of strategies to ensure that each 
individual tariff price is suitable to their respective market condition and in keeping 
with the individual objectives of the port organisation.  Utilization of this strategy 
ensures that the appropriate pricing strategy is adopted for each tariff item.  In 
addition the CPV pricing strategy attempts to provide the port and its users with the 
best value within the transport chain.  A detailed breakdown of the value chain of a 
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port is provided in Appendix A.  Each component of the strategy is tailored to suit 
the individual objectives of the port body as described in the chart below: 
 
Pricing Strategy Objectives 
Cost • Revenues sufficient to maintain 
the quality of service 
• Revenues to fund new business 
activities 
• Prices to reflect costs and provide 
cost mechanism 
Performance • Prices high enough to encourage 
efficient use of service 
Value • Prices low enough to compete for 
new cargoes 
• Prices not so high as to 
discourage growth of captive 
cargoes 
• Prices high enough to capture 
profit from those who benefit 
most from port services 
Adapted from UNCTAD. (April 1999). 
 
1.4  Problem Identification 
Whilst Ports readily adapt the cost and performance components of the CPV pricing 
strategy, the value-based component presents a unique challenge.  As proposed by 
UNCTAD the value-based pricing strategy can be applied to differentiated cargoes 
through broad definitions such as general cargo including break-bulk and 
containerised cargo, dry and liquid bulk cargoes.  However, the substitution effect as 
evidenced by global movements away from trade in break-bulk cargo for 
containerised cargo will cause a rethinking of the value-based component of the CPV 
pricing strategy as it is applied to cargo.   
 
Ports facing this situation (i.e substitution effect) may no longer be able to determine 
the differences in the value of benefits accruing to customers of break bulk cargo as 
opposed to containerised cargo.  As the substitution effect becomes more acute, the 
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very premise of the value-based tariff will be eroded since original break bulk cargo 
would now all be transported as LCL containers.   In this situation, ports are seeking 
to implement a value based tariff system for cargo dues / wharfage would need to 
differentiate those cargo owners who stand to benefit the most from the use of the 
port services.  However, since the port’s break bulk cargo traffic has been converted 
to containerised cargo, the imposition of a fixed charge (cargo dues / wharfage) to all 
containers handled, regardless of the type and value of the cargo contained therein, 
means that the charge levied represents a higher proportion of the lower valued 
cargoes as compared with the higher valued cargoes.  For example, a fixed wharfage 
charge of $100/box levied against one box loaded with computers valued at $500,000 
and another loaded with textiles valued at $100,000 results in the following.  The 
wharfage on the box with the computers represents only 0.02% of the value of the 
computers whereas it amounts to 0.1% of the value of the textiles.  The incidence of 
the wharfage applied in this manner thus distorts the true value of the respective 
cargoes transported in the containers.   Therefore, the new challenge to ports is to 
apply value-based tariffs (e.g. cargo dues/wharfage) to cargoes transported in 
containers perhaps based upon the differentiation and value of the actual items 
transported.  This would ensure that port pricing is in keeping with the cost structure 
of the relevant supply chains thereby meeting the strategic objective of the port itself.  
 
 
1.5  Objective 
The main aim of this thesis is to assess the efficacy of a computer based model 
(using appropriate computer software) that will assist ports wishing to utilize a 
market driven pricing strategy in the establishment of value-based tariffs for cargoes 
transported in containers and as break bulk.  In seeking to address the above this 
thesis will: -   
1. Explore the efficacy of applying value-based tariffs for differentiated cargoes 
transported in containers.  Such differentiation to be based upon value. 
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2.  Explore the efficacy of applying value-based tariffs for break bulk cargoes 
based upon their respective values. 
Such a model, when provided with the required inputs will propose an upper and 
lower limit within which the tariff may be set.   
 
1.6 Significance Of Research 
The rapid spread of globalisation and supply chain management continues to place 
increased pressure on port administrators to abolish traditional port management 
methods in favour of modern business practices.  Consequently, port pricing plays an 
important role since it has the ability to adversely affect the supply chain and in so 
doing the value afforded to the end customers.  As containerisation continues to 
replace break-bulk cargo transport, port administrators will be hard pressed to adopt 
modern pricing policies, such as value-based strategies, that will augment rather than 
distort the relevant value chains within the supply chain.  Port administrators will 
therefore be provided with an alternative method for the application of value based 
pricing strategies on cargo transported in containers and break-bulk cargo. 
 
 
1.7  Methodology 
Statistics and data gathered from the Saint Lucia Air and Sea Ports Authority 
(SLASPA), which owns and operates the Port of Castries situated on the island of 
Saint Lucia in the West Indies, was utilised in seeking to explore the efficacy of a 
computer based model for the establishment of a value-based tariff.   
 
The data provided by SLASPA includes types of vessels calling at the port, types and 
values of cargo handled at the port and the current tariff rates applied for the port’s 
resources and services.  Ancillary data obtained from the Saint Lucia Central 
Statistics Office and the Customs Department helped to augment that received from 
SLASPA.   
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Microsoft Excel (a spreadsheet computer software) was used for research and 
development of the proposed model. 
 
1.8  Limitations Of The Research 
Difficulty in obtaining all pertinent information regarding CIF values for 
cargoes imported/exported through Port Castries from the Customs 
Department or SLASPA 
Lack of verifiable information to accurately define and calculate elasticities 
for cargo transported through Port Castries 
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2 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF PORT PRICING 
 
 
2.1  Background 
The various approaches to the issue of port pricing have been greatly influenced by 
the differing types of ownership of the ports themselves.  As mentioned in the 
introductory chapter, the ownership of ports vacillates between State (local or 
regional government) owned to that of a private commercial enterprise.  Within these 
two extremes ownership of ports around the world take on varied forms and 
combinations, which then impact on the approaches taken to port pricing. This 
occurs because each type of ownership would have its own objective.  For instance, a 
state owned port might seek to advance the economic interests of the country at the 
expense of any financial goal.  Thus the port would not seek to recover all of its costs 
from the users of its services.  Rather, its operation would be financed through 
taxation that would then be received as a direct subsidy from the government.  At the 
other end of the spectrum is a privately owned port whose main objective would be 
that of profit maximization.  Consequently, the users of its services would be made to 
cover all costs plus an added premium (Strandenes & Marlow 2000).   
 
Whilst it can be said that all ports have differing goals and objectives, Bennathan and 
Walters (1979) suggested that ports share the same motivation for all of their pricing 
policies and investment decisions i.e. promotion of the national interest.  However, 
they further suggested that there are two basic underlying principles namely the 
(continental) European and the Anglo-Saxon doctrines.  Under the European doctrine 
the port is viewed as part of the social infrastructure and as such its contribution is 
viewed in the context of the regional development rather than profitability.  
Conversely, ports operating under the Anglo-Saxon doctrine must generate a profit 
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or at least be able to stand on their own.  Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that 
common to all these approaches is the use of economic techniques and principles to 
solve the question of port pricing  
 
 
2.2   Traditional Cost Based Approach 
Prior to the 1970’s most ports practised some form of traditional cost based pricing 
wherein a financial approach to pricing was utilized.  This practise is continued in 
some measure to the present day.  Under this approach to pricing, tariffs are usually 
set at levels that seek to recover fixed and variable costs while providing an adequate 
return on investment and working capital employed (Frankel, E.G. 1987).  
Consequently, average cost is most often used in the determination of the tariff levels.  
However, as stipulated by Frankel (1987), use of this approach is extremely complex 
since pricing generally determines the level of demand and in doing so affects the 
long-run cost and the level of return. 
 
 
2.3  Economic Approach To Pricing 
During the 1970’s developments in the area of port pricing attempted to change the 
traditional approach of using purely accounting costs (fixed and variable costs) to 
establish port tariffs.  Using economic theory, it was argued that prices should be 
developed on the amount of resources used in providing that particular service rather 
than on what the service produced.  Essentially, the marginal cost should be used as 
the base rather than average costs.  Jansson and Ryden (1979) proposed a two-part 
tariff scheme based upon the usage of marginal costs.  They proposed a charge to be 
levied per tonne on cargo differentiated with respect to its elasticity of demand and 
another charge to be levied on the carrier to reflect the opportunity cost of using the 
facility.1   
 
                                                
1 As discussed in Strandenes and Marlow (2000) Pg.318 
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Departing slightly from this approach, writers such as Button (1979) attempted to 
introduce a system wherein the users of the port would be required to pay the full 
marginal social opportunity cost (MSOC) of the resources they use at the port.  The 
MSOC pricing approach starts from the axiom that the port provides a public service 
and as such its main objective is the economic good of the state or country that it 
serves.  Consequently the port seeks, at best, to break even financially with regard to 
its operating costs.  Following from this premise it can easily be conferred that the 
State owns the port.  Button (1979) attempted to formalise this approach utilizing 
‘New Welfare Economics’.  Differing slightly from the theorists at that time, Button 
applied economic theories based upon parking space allocation rather than on road 
usage that was commonly used.  He argued that the MSOC system of pricing acted 
as a rationing mechanism that gave priority to potential users who were prepared to 
pay all costs (including external costs) for utilizing the port’s services (Button 1979).   
However, in discussing this method of pricing, Button acknowledged that economies 
of scale experienced in most ports would present particular problems if the short run 
marginal cost pricing was used.  Under conditions of increasing returns, the capital 
costs associated with investment in items such as infrastructure and superstructure 
would not be recoverable.  As a result Button proposed three alternative ways of 
recovering these capital expenditures. He suggested that the government could 
directly subsidize the investments or alternatively the port authority could practise a 
system of discriminate pricing.  As another alternative, Button proposed that the port 
could adopt a two-part tariff using the MSOC pricing for the cargo handled and a 
fixed periodic charge for the right to use the facility.   This user charge would then 
reflect the capital expenditures.   
 
Similar to the theorists of their time Bennathan and Walters (1979) argued that all 
port tariffs should be based upon the short run marginal cost, which would allow for 
efficient management.  They further intimated that the tariff should at least cover the 
assigned variable cost of providing the service.  In accounting for economies of scale, 
Bennathan and Walters suggested that the European Doctrine that supports 
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government subsidies would allow for the continued operation of the ports.  
Nevertheless, they cautioned the use of such subsidies since they realised that there 
were significant practical arguments against its use. 
  
 
2.4  Congestion Pricing Approach 
Having realised that excessive demand for port services creates congestion within 
ports, Bennathan and Walters (1979) suggested that the use of congestion levies and 
surcharges might provide ports the opportunity to earn high profits. They argued that 
increasing the price (congestion levy) would provide users the incentive to 
economise on the scarce resource.  Similar to this approach, Strandenes and Marlow 
(2000) advocate the use of congestion pricing to obtain efficient exploitation of the 
port capacities.  Nevertheless they contend that the main part of the congestion cost 
is related to the opportunity cost of vessel time since it reflects the alternative income 
the vessel foregoes by postponing the next fixture and the capital cost of the cargo 
itself.  Whilst not articulated in that precise form, Bennathan and Walters (1979) 
indicated that ship owners were quick to add their queuing costs to the freight rates.  
Thus any increase or application of congestion levies would perhaps benefit the port 
at the expense of the shippers if the demand for port services was inelastic.  They 
also contended that its practical application would present problems especially if the 
congestion tended to be seasonal.  As a result, prices would vary over the season 
making it difficult to administer.   
 
 
2.5  Strategic Pricing 
Having recognised that ports are increasingly forced to operate within a competitive 
environment, economists and practitioners in the field of port pricing have sought 
ways to allocate benefits derived from port investments among the various 
stakeholders (i.e. shippers, ship owners and the government) whilst better utilizing 
the expensive port assets (UNCTAD 1975).  Developing upon the economic 
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approach to port pricing it was suggested that ports should focus on three elements: 
costs, to recover the expenses incurred in providing port services and facilities; 
utilization, to rationalize the use of port assets; and prices structured on what the 
traffic can bear (UNCTAD 1995).  Utilizing this multi-faceted approach to pricing 
meant that ports could now use port pricing as a main tool in assisting ports to 
achieve their strategic goals and objectives.  Consequently, the term strategic pricing 
as defined by UNCTAD 1995 is “the use of pricing as a mechanism for achieving 
competitive advantage.”  This approach to pricing was enhanced by Arnold (1985), 
who also suggested that port tariffs should be based on a mix of pricing strategies 
that were designed to reflect the demand for port services, the competition amongst 
ports, and the costs incurred in providing those services.2   
 
In furthering the idea of focusing on three elements in order to set port tariffs, 
UNCTAD (1975) proposed the ‘cost, performance, value (CPV) approach.’  They 
claim that this approach allows managers to accomplish different sets of objectives 
through the use of tariffs.  As described by Strandenes and Marlow (2000), “cost 
based tariffs can maximise the use of port services; performance based tariffs can 
maximise the throughput and reduce congestion; value based tariffs generate 
sufficient revenue to cover the port’s costs.”  In effect it is argued that the CPV 
approach provides flexibility for the port managers in establishing tariff limits.  Thus, 
since the port cannot charge less than the incremental cost of providing the service, 
and cannot charge more than the value received by the user, the approach establishes 
both a floor and a ceiling for pricing purposes (Strandenes & Marlow 2000). 
 
The use of pricing as a strategic element in meeting the strategic goals and objectives 
of ports has been further developed and applied to the recent phenomena of port 
privatisation.  Ashar, A (2001) discusses the use of this principle for newly privatised 
ports and seeks to develop a formal methodology for performing strategic pricing 
                                                
2 As discussed in Strandenes & Marlow (2000) 
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analysis.  In doing so he recommends that adoption of this approach would facilitate 
stability and avert possible price wars. 
 
2.6  General Discussion 
Having reviewed the literature on port pricing it is evident that the issue has been the 
subject of much thought and discussion especially during recent times.  Whilst no 
one writer has been able to satisfactorily argue for any one approach to pricing, there 
appears to be a gradual shift towards the use of strategic pricing for all the various 
types of port ownership.  As ports continue to evolve, they are no longer viewed as 
providing a public service and are consequently challenged to be self-sustaining and 
to operate along commercial lines.  In this regard, the use of the CPV approach as 
suggested by UNCTAD appears to be aptly suited to this purpose.  Nevertheless, one 
of the major drawbacks to its use is the high level of data that is required by the port 
in order to correctly utilize this approach to tariff setting. 
 
Although first mooted in 1975 for the port sector, the value-based approach to price 
setting is currently widely used in other forms of business.  One example of this was 
cited by George Cressman, a product-pricing consultant at Strategic                   
Pricing Group Inc. in Marlboro, Massachusetts (Steadman, C. 2000) who indicated 
that a pharmaceutical maker used value-based pricing techniques (instead of actual 
costs incurred in developing the new drug) to get a higher price from medical 
insurers for a new anti-ulcer drug.  Their studies showed that use of the drug would 
prevent expensive surgery in the future resulting in lower costs for the health 
insurance companies.  Aside from this example perhaps the single biggest user of 
this approach to pricing is the burgeoning computer software industry.  Rather than 
pricing the software according to the costs incurred in producing it, the vendors look 
towards the value provided to their customers who use this software.  If viewed from 
another angle, one may argue that the actual intrinsic value of the CD containing the 
software is out of equilibrium with the price charged.  However, the real value of the 
software is not in the CD itself but in the service provided to the customer by its use. 
 14
Similarly, the value afforded to cargo owners is not equivalent to the actual cost 
associated with the cargo handling but rather to the benefit derived from receiving 
the cargo.  Whilst recognising that value-based tariffs can be applied in numerous 
areas associated with the cargo handling at the port, this paper will focus primarily 
on the application of wharfage which is itself a usage charge rather than a charge for 
providing an actual service.  As indicated in Chapter 1, movement away from break 
bulk to containerised cargo presents a peculiar situation for ports wishing to 
implement a value-based wharfage tariff.  The challenge for the port is to implement 
this pricing strategy in a fair manner to all cargoes transported in containers without 
prejudicing one product or category of products over another.  Essentially, the charge 
levied should attempt to recover what the individual markets can bear without 
distorting the relevant supply chains. 
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3 
 
 
PORT CASTRIES  
AND  
THE SAINT LUCIA AIR AND SEA PORTS AUTHORITY 
 
 
 3.1  The Island Of Saint Lucia 
The island of Saint Lucia is located midway down the eastern Caribbean chain of 
islands.  At coordinates 13.53° N and 60.68° W, Saint Lucia is one of the Windward 
Islands of the Lesser Antilles.  Situated between the islands of Martinique to the 
north and Saint Vincent to the south, Saint Lucia is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean 
on its eastern coast and the Caribbean Sea on the west.  Measuring 27 miles (43 km) 
at its longest point and 14 miles (22 km) across at its widest point, Saint Lucia 
approximately covers 238 sq miles (381 sq km).  Within this relatively small 
landmass, the island supports two deep-water harbours – Port Castries located in the 
northern part of the island and Port Vieux-Fort located at the southern most tip of the 
island.  Two airports assist in meeting the needs of air transport to and from Saint 
Lucia.  Hewanorra Airport located in the south of the island has a runway length of 
9,000 ft (2,744 metres) and George F. L. Charles Airport located in the north has a 
runway length of 6,200 ft (1,890 metres). (Saint Lucia Air and Sea Ports Authority 
2000). 
 
 
3.2  Basic Facts About Saint Lucia 
In 1999 the population of Saint Lucia was estimated at 153,703 persons with an 
annual population growth rate of 1.15 (The Saint Lucia Central Statistics Office, 
2001).  The local currency used is the Eastern Caribbean Dollar (ECD), which is 
officially pegged at an exchange rate of ECD 2.67 to the US Dollar.  This currency is 
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shared by eight small island economies of the Eastern Caribbean comprising 
Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, 
St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, and St Vincent and The Grenadines and is managed by 
a central monetary authority, the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. (Eastern 
Caribbean Central Bank, 1999).  Saint Lucia recorded an estimated GDP in 1999 of 
650 million US dollars that translated into a GNP per capita of USD 3,770 (The 
World Bank Group, 2000). 
 
3.3  Overview Of The Saint Lucia Air And Sea Ports Authority (SLASPA) 
Established by Parliamentary Act No. 10 of 1983, the Saint Lucia Air and Sea Ports 
Authority (SLASPA) is charged with the responsibility of providing for co-ordinated 
and integrated systems of airports, seaports and port services. (Saint Lucia Air and 
Sea Ports Authority Act, Government of Saint Lucia Printing Office 1983)  Thus 
responsibility for the management of both airports and both seaports falls within the 
purview of SLASPA.  Being governed by this act means that SLASPA is a statutory 
body which ultimately reports jointly to the Minister of Finance and the Minister of 
Communications and Works.  As customary for organisations of this type, SLASPA 
is administered by a ten-member council whom are appointed by the Head of State 
whilst a management team manages the day-to-day operations. 
 
As stipulated by the Act, the revenues of SLASPA are derived from all dues and 
charges levied with respect to the services that it provides.  However, supplementary 
income may be derived from loans acquired from the Government or other 
organisations.   
 
 
3.4  Physical Characteristics Of Port Castries 
Port Castries is a natural, sheltered deep-water seaport situated on the north-western 
side of the island.  The landward perimeter of the port is bounded by the capital city, 
Castries that restricts further expansion of the port area.  The port has an entrance 
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channel width of 400 ft (122 metres), a draught of 42 ft (13 metres) and a turning 
circle radius of 1400 ft (427 metres).  Being a multipurpose terminal, Port Castries 
comprises 5 berths (3 of which are continuous) totalling 2542 ft (775 metres) with a 
maintained depth alongside of 32 ft (9.75 metres).  The majority of break-bulk 
operations are handled at berths 2 and 3, which have a combined quay length of 750 
ft (229 metres).  Berths 4 and 5 handle the majority of the container traffic with berth 
5 having the ability to handle ro-ro vessels.  The main export of the island, bananas, 
is handled at berth 6 which is also used to handle a range of bagged and bulk 
commodities including lumber, cement etc.  Two additional berths are provided as 
part of a dedicated cruise ship facility.  These berths measure 400 ft (122 metres) and 
300 ft (91 metres) respectively with a maintained draft of 36 ft (11 metres).   
 
Storage facilities at the port include 6 individual sheds for dry cargo with a combined 
covered shed storage area of 120,000 sq ft (11,200 m2.).  Four cold storage facilities 
are also provided with a combined storage capacity of 66,402 cu ft (1881 m3).  Sixty 
refrigerated containers can be simultaneously serviced at the port through 
connections to the reefer points located at the port.  The space available for storage 
of containers at the container park is currently limited to 400 teu ground slots. 
 
Two mobile shore cranes, one of which was newly commissioned in April 2000, 
provide cargo-handling capability at the port.  Four high capacity top handlers and an 
empty container handler provide quay transfer, stacking, delivery and receipt 
operations for containerised cargo.  This is supplemented by terminal tractor-trailer 
yard operating equipment.  Stuffing and stripping container operations and break-
bulk handling is carried out using various capacity forklift trucks (Flt’s). 
 
3.4.1  Management And Operation Of Port Castries 
Prior to 1995, the ports of Vieux-Fort and Castries were managed and operated by 
SLASPA.  However, in February of that same year the management of the port of 
Vieux-Fort came under the control of a private company, Saint Lucia Marine 
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Terminals Limited (SLMTL), that is a subsidiary of SLASPA.  In this relationship 
Port Vieux Fort is a tool port with all the infrastructure and superstructure provided 
by SLASPA for which leasing fees and dividends are paid in return by SLMTL.  
Nevertheless, all management and stevedoring operations at Port Castries are still 
provided by SLASPA who recruits labour from the Seamen Waterfront and General 
Workers Union.  Consequently, SLASPA is deemed an operating port authority at 
Port Castries. 
 
3.4.2  Tariffs 
The tariff schedule established and governed by Statutory Legislation in 1985 for all 
services rendered at the ports in Saint Lucia continue to the present without any 
amendments having been made.  As stipulated in the tariff, SLASPA does not 
recognise individual owners of cargo but rather imposes all applicable dues on the 
vessels themselves.  Nevertheless, charges such as storage for cargo held at the port 
in excess of the regulated free period is directly charged to the cargo owner.  
Identical tariffs are levied in the Port of Vieux-Fort since SLMTL is a subsidiary 
company of SLASPA.   
 
This thesis will concentrate on the application of ‘Cargo dues’ (Wharfage) levied 
against break-bulk and containerised cargo.  The following is extracted from the 
Saint Lucia Air and Sea Ports Authority (Seaport Tariff) Regulations with regards to 
the application of ‘cargo dues’ for break-bulk and containerised cargo: 
SCHEDULE 4 (BREAK-BULK) 
4. Cargo Dues Ships using a Port shall pay Cargo Dues as 
follows:- 
(I) Cargo carried in ships over 100 GRT - $6.00 per 
ton or part thereof landed or loaded. 
(II) Cargo N.O.S. carried in ships under 100 GRT - 
$1.00 per ton or part thereof landed or loaded. 
 19
(III) Cargo consisting of agricultural products of Saint 
Lucia carried in ships under 100 GRT – 50 cents 
per ton or part thereof landed or loaded. 
SCHEDULE 6 
DUES AND CHARGES FOR CONTAINERS 
2. Other Dues and Charges  Other dues and charges for containers shall 
be as follows:- 
(I) For landing or shipping a container loaded with 
cargo   -  $400.00 per TEU 
(II) For landing or shipping an empty container  - 
$100.00 per TEU 
The charges in (I) and (II) above shall include Cargo 
Dues and Cargo Handling but shall not include 
stevedoring, storage charges or any stuffing and 
unstuffing. 
 
It should be noted that the charges quoted above and throughout this thesis are and 
will be in the local Eastern Caribbean Currency.  Although both cargo handling and 
cargo dues are incorporated into one charge for containers, they will be separated 
when the aspect of containers is dealt with in chapter 5. 
 
 
3.4.3  Traffic 
Port Castries, being a multi-purpose port handles varying types of cargo from bulk 
aggregates and palletised banana exports to containerised cargo.   Nevertheless, this 
thesis will only focus on break-bulk cargo and containerised cargo throughput at the 
port.   
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3.4.3(a) Break-bulk Cargo 
Port Castries handled a total of 158,634 tons of imported and exported break-bulk in 
the year 2000.  Imported break-bulk of 111,373 tons accounted for approximately 
70% of that total whilst exports, inclusive of banana exports, comprised 47,261 tons 
representing 30% of the total.    The following table shows the tonnages of break-
bulk imported and exported through Port Castries for the period 1992 – 2000. 
 
Table 3.1 – Break-bulk cargo including banana exports handled at Port 
Castries   1992 – 2000 (Short Tons) 
YEAR IMPORT EXPORT TOTAL 
1992 133707 83824 217531 
1993 126759 75296 202055 
1994 114682 58747 173429 
1995 116130 65124 181254 
1996 115267 57978 173245 
1997 118044 34807 152851 
1998 118956 37157 156113 
1999 130232 40664 170896 
2000 111373 47261 158634 
Source: Compiled from SLASPA annual Statistical Digest 1993, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000 
 
Analysis of the above reveals that Port Castries recorded a 27% reduction in total 
break-bulk imported and exported through the port as compared with 1992 tonnages. 
Exports of break-bulk recorded a 43.7% reduction in exported tonnages in the year 
2000 as compared with 1992 tonnages.  Imports of break-bulk also reduced by 16.7% 
in 2000 as compared with 1992 levels. 
 
Since special conditions apply for the levying of cargo dues (Wharfage) on banana 
exports, its respective annual contribution to the break-bulk tonnages will be 
subtracted for the purposes of this thesis.  In addition, research has revealed that the 
export of bananas from Port Castries will be terminated shortly since the Port of 
Vieux Fort in the south of the island has been officially designated the official 
banana loading port.   
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Table 3.2 - Break-bulk cargo excluding banana exports handled at Port 
Castries 1992 – 2000 (Short Tons) 
YEAR IMPORT EXPORT TOTAL 
1992 133707 3282 136989 
1993 126759 2286 129045 
1994 114682 2097 116779 
1995 116130 2600 118730 
1996 115267 3211 118478 
1997 118044 3051 121095 
1998 118956 2540 121496 
1999 130232 1710 131942 
2000 111373 1792 113165 
Source: Compiled from SLASPA Annual Statistical Digest 1993, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000 
 
3.4.3(b)  Containerised Cargo 
In the year 2000, Port Castries handled a total of 27,050 TEUs, which comprised 
import, export, and transhipment of both full and empty containers.  This represented 
an increase of 7.8% over 1999 levels.  However, as indicated earlier, cargo dues are 
only levied on imported or exported containers at Port Castries.  Accordingly, only 
the levels of imported and exported containers are highlighted in the following table. 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that transhipment business conducted at Port 
Castries amounted to 1,281 teu’s in the year 2000. 
 
Table 3.3 - Imported and exported containerised cargo at Port Castries 1992 
– 2000 (TEUs) 
  IMPORT EXPORT TOTAL TOTAL 
YEAR Empty Full Empty Full Import Export Imp/Exp 
1992 220 8931 8158 1119 9151 9277 18428 
1993 460 9851 8327 1399 10311 9726 20037 
1994 815 10234 9108 1376 11049 10484 21533 
1995 663 10593 10095 961 11256 11056 22312 
1996 959 9897 10356 725 10856 11081 21937 
1997 568 9385 9126 639 9953 9765 19718 
1998 486 10093 9178 583 10579 9761 20340 
1999 205 12722 11288 840 12927 12128 25055 
2000 120 12442 12307 900 12562 13207 25769 
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The trends observed for both break-bulk and containerised cargo handled at Port 
Castries suggests that the port might be experiencing a substitution effect from cargo 
being transported as break-bulk to that transported in containers. Consequently, the 
tonnages of cargo transported in containers for the same period was compiled in 
order to allow for comparison with break-bulk activity.  The result is illustrated in the 
following tables. 
 
Table 3.4 - Tonnages of imported and exported cargo transported in 
containers at Port Castries 1992 – 2000 (Short Tons) 
  IMPORT EXPORT TOTAL 
YEAR Empty Full Empty Full Import Export 
1992 554 166671 21412 19902 167225 41314 
1993 1194 181295 21907 25329 182489 47236 
1994 2128 191459 23974 24630 193587 48604 
1995 1768 202453 26671 16557 204221 43228 
1996 2568 192987 27286 11034 195555 38320 
1997 1490 183652 24058 9965 185142 34023 
1998 1278 198361 24231 8664 199639 32895 
1999 527 246990 29901 12691 247517 42592 
2000 318 244123 32632 14226 244441 46858 
Source: Compiled from SLASPA Annual Statistical Digest 1993, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000 
 
Table 3.5 - Comparison of break-bulk and containerised cargo handled at 
Port Castries 1992 – 2000  
YEAR IMPORT EXPORT TOTAL 
  General Cargo Containers General cargo Containers GC CONT 
1992 45% 55% 14% 86% 42% 58% 
1993 41% 59% 8% 92% 38% 62% 
1994 37% 63% 8% 92% 35% 65% 
1995 36% 64% 14% 86% 35% 65% 
1996 37% 63% 23% 77% 37% 63% 
1997 39% 61% 23% 77% 38% 62% 
1998 37% 63% 23% 77% 37% 63% 
1999 35% 65% 12% 88% 34% 66% 
2000 31% 69% 11% 89% 30% 70% 
Source: Compiled from SLASPA Annual Statistical Digest 1993, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000 
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It can be ascertained from the above data that the percentage share of break-bulk 
tonnages to the overall tonnages of import and export cargo handled at the port 
decreased over the period.  More specifically, whilst break-bulk imports represented 
45% of total imports in 1992 this decreased to 31% in 2000.  Similarly, break-bulk 
exports decreased from 14% in 1992 to 11% in 2000.  This scenario is presented in 
the following figures. 
 
Figure 3.1 - Composition of Import tonnages by Break-bulk and containerized 
cargo 1992 – 2000 
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Figure 3.2 - Percentage contribution to total import tonnage by break-bulk 
and containerized cargo 1992 – 2000 
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Figure 3.3 - Composition of export tonnages by break-bulk and containerized 
cargo 1992 – 2000 
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Figure 3.4 - Percentage contribution to total export tonnage by break-bulk 
and containerized cargo 1992 – 2000 
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As indicated earlier, the presence of this substitution effect has significant 
implications for ports wishing to implement value-based tariffs.  Consequently, the 
following chapters will seek to provide a suitable means for addressing this situation. 
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4 
 
 
THE VALUE CHAIN AND EXISTING TARIFF STRUCTURE 
OF 
PORT CASTRIES 
 
4.1  Value Chain and Tariff Structure of Port Castries 
In seeking to assess the efficacy of value based cargo dues for cargo transported in 
containers at Port Castries it is necessary to identify the value chain of the port.  
Doing so allows a better understanding of the nuances involved and the identification 
of possible impacts of the change in tariff structure on clients of the port.  The 
process of identifying the value chain of Port Castries is done with the assistance of 
UNCTAD’s 1975 depiction of the value chain of a large port as illustrated in 
Appendix A.  Whilst the identification of the value chain is beneficial, its use is 
further extended when knowledge of the existing tariff structure at the port is used in 
conjunction with it.   At present SLASPA being an operating port authority is solely 
responsible for the application and collection of charges for all services supplied at 
the port with the exception of landside telephone communication, potable water - 
provided by the Water and Sewerage Company, or bunkering services - which is 
done by tanker lorries.  Similar to most operating port tariffs, the SLASPA Seaport 
Tariff is segmented into charges applicable to the ship and charges applicable to the 
cargo although all charges are billed directly to the ship.  Bearing this in mind, the 
two issues regarding the value chain of port Castries and the existing tariff is dealt 
with simultaneously in the following sections. 
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4.2  Value Added Services to the Ship 
The services to the ship provided by SLASPA can be broken down into two main 
categories namely safe navigation and services at the berth.  Thus the value added 
from these activities is provided to the shipowner and the various freight forwarders 
operating at the port.  This value is created through the speedy and careful handling 
of cargo to and from the ships within a reasonable time period (UNCTAD 1995) and 
the safe berthing of ships. 
 
 
4.2.1  Safe navigation 
SLASPA provides value to the ship through activities and facilities such as the 
provision of aids to navigation, adequate depth of the channel and alongside the 
berths, compulsory pilotage for ships over 100GRT and towage for ships greater than 
250 feet LOA.  These services ensure that all vessels entering or leaving the port are 
provided with safe navigation.  Recovery of the costs associated with the provision 
of these facilities and services is sought by various charges as detailed in the Seaport 
Tariff.   
 
The charge for pilotage is calculated per move differentiated according to the GRT of 
the vessel serviced.  This charge starts at EC$25 per move for vessels under 100 
GRT up to a maximum of EC$300 per move corresponding to vessels over 20,000 
GRT.  Since the pilots are monthly paid workers of SLASPA, the charge attempts to 
recover the fixed costs associated with the salaries of the pilots and the fixed and 
variable costs associated with the capital cost and the variable operational costs of 
the pilot vessels.   
 
Navigational aids, charged at EC$0.02 per GRT subject to a minimum charge of 
EC$15.00 and a maximum charge of EC$100.00 attempts to cover the costs 
associated with the purchase, installation and maintenance of the various navigation 
aids located within the harbour limits.   
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Similar to pilotage, the charge for towage is calculated per move starting at 
EC$400.00 per move for vessels measuring 400 feet LOA to a maximum of 
EC$500.00 per move for vessels 500 feet and over.  However, although towage is 
charged by SLASPA the service is provided by a private company, Tugs Ltd, who 
invoices SLASPA based upon a different scale.  The amounts actually billed to 
SLASPA by Tugs Ltd for the towage services performed are calculated at a rate of 
EC$1.24 per foot per move.  In addition, although SLASPA does not charge towage 
to ships below 400 feet LOA they nevertheless pay Tugs Ltd a flat fee of EC$350 per 
ship per move for all ships below 400 feet LOA.  Consequently, SLASPA subsidizes 
the cost of towage charged to all ships.   
 
 
4.2.2  Services at the berth 
This aspect of the value chain provided at Port Castries includes berthing, 
stevedoring, equipment, water, bunkers, garbage removal, communications and 
wharf handling.  Although all of these services that add value to the ship, are 
available at the berth, they are not all provided by SLASPA.  Individual service 
providers who invoice the ship separately provide all the services of water, bunkers, 
garbage removal and communications.  The Water and Sewerage Company provides 
water at the berths; various individual contractors hired by the ship’s agents 
themselves provide garbage removal; local agents of Shell and Texaco provide 
bunkers via tanker lorries and the sole telecommunications provider, Cable and 
Wireless St. Lucia Ltd offers landside communication services.   
 
As indicated earlier, SLASPA provides berthing, stevedoring, wharf handling and 
equipment services at the berth, which adds value to the ship.  Value is added 
through the provision of a secure berth at which the ship is able to fulfil its contract 
(Bill of Lading) in either delivering or receiving cargo.  In the course of doing so the 
port incurs costs that are recoverable from the charges levied.  With regard to 
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berthing, the tariff is segmented into three areas including running lines, pratique and 
clearance.   
 
Running Lines is charged on the arrival, shifting and departure of ships and is 
calculated in accordance with the GRT of the vessel.  A minimum charge of 
EC$15.00 is applied for ships under 100 GRT up to a maximum of EC$80.00 for 
ships over 5,000 GRT between the hours of 0800 and 1600 Monday to Friday.  This 
tariff is doubled for work conducted at any other time.  Although the charges are 
applied and calculated by SLASPA, a private company, Lawrencin Lines Ltd 
performs the tasks on SLASPA’s behalf.  Consequently, they are paid 70% of the 
revenues generated from the tariff applied by SLASPA for running lines.   
 
The tariff for ‘pratique’ is calculated and applied similar to that of running lines.  A 
charge of EC$10.00 is charged to all ships under 100 GRT that is not engaged in 
commercial trading at any time.  However, a similar charge of EC$10.00 is 
applicable to ships under 100 GRT who are engaged in trading but increases to 
EC$20.00 for ships over 100 GRT.  Again this charge is only applicable between 
0800 hrs to 1600 hrs Monday to Friday.  The respective charge for vessels engaged 
in trading doubles for work conducted at any other time.  The clearance charge on 
the other hand is a singular charge of EC$20 for all ships using the berth regardless 
of type, size or business orientation. 
 
Charges for wharf handling are separated into port dues, cargo dues, passenger dues 
and cargo handling. These dues are applied not only for use of the port and berths but 
also for the receipt and delivery of cargo to and from ships to other modes of 
transport and storage.  Port dues are based upon the ship’s GRT and a minimum of 
EC$15.00 is charged for ships under 100 GRT for the first 48 hours in port.  This 
charge increases to EC$300.00 for ships over 15,000 GRT for the same time period.  
Ships staying longer than this time period incur an additional cost for every 24 hour 
period ranging from EC$10.00 for ships under 100 GRT to EC$200.00 for ships over 
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15,000 GRT.  The cumulative vessel charges collected in the financial year 
2000/2001 were approximately EC$2.1 million. 
 
Cargo dues are paid in accordance with the weight of break bulk cargo carried by 
ships in port.  Ships over 100 GRT pay EC$6.00 per ton of cargo carried and ships 
under 100 GRT pay EC$1.00 per ton of break bulk cargo carried.  These cargo dues 
are also applied to transhipment cargo on both movements.  Ships carrying 
containerised cargo also incur cargo dues but this charge is incorporated cargo 
handling charges into a singular charge of EC$400.00 per TEU for full containers 
and EC$100.00 per TEU for empty containers.   
 
Passenger dues of EC$10.00 per passenger embarking or disembarking is charged to 
all ships carrying passengers at the port.  For passengers in transit, a charge of 
US$5.00 (Head tax) is charged instead of the embarkation or disembarkation tariff 
quoted above.  However, it must be mentioned that the passenger in transit levy is 
applied on behalf of the government of St. Lucia for which SLASPA is given 25% of 
the revenues generated from this tariff item.  Nevertheless, the portion of the head 
tax received by SLASPA is used to recover a EC 30 million dollar investment in two 
dedicated cruise ship berths constructed and commissioned in 1999.  The application 
of the tariff for passengers including that for in transit passengers contributed EC$2.7 
million for the financial year 2000/2001.  
 
Cargo handling charges are levied differently on break bulk cargo and on 
containerised cargo.  This charge covers the service of receiving from the ship’s 
hook, sorting and checking to the bill of lading, transfer to a place of rest and 
delivery and vice versa (SLASPA Seaport Tariff).  Import break bulk cargo is 
charged at a rate of EC$10.00 per ton if handled directly into a vehicle or EC$20.00 
per ton otherwise.  Export break bulk handled directly from vehicles is charged 
similar to that for import general cargo handled in the same manner whilst a charge 
of EC$15.00 per ton is levied for export break bulk cargo handled otherwise.  
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Various other charges apply for break bulk cargo overlanded or overcarried, sorting 
of cargo within a bill of lading and for coopering (handling damaged cargo or 
repairing the packaging).  A charge of EC$16.00 per ton is also charged for handling 
break bulk transhipment cargo.  Containerised cargo on the other hand is charged at a 
rate of EC$400.00 per TEU for landing or shipping a full container and EC$100.00 
per TEU for landing or shipping an empty container.  As stated earlier, this charge 
also includes cargo dues for use of the berths.  Transhipment containers are charged 
EC$200.00 per TEU for full containers and EC$100.00 per TEU for empties.  
Additional charges of EC$70.00 per TEU per move for full containers and EC$20.00 
per TEU per move for empty containers is levied for shifting containers during 
stevedoring operations.  Total charges to cargo contributed EC$11.2 million to 
revenue for the financial year 2000/2001. 
 
 
The full cost of labour and supervision employed on board a ship plus the cost of 
equipment used for loading or unloading is applied to the ship.  An additional charge 
of 10% and 15% of the labour and supervision cost is applied for insurance cover and 
employers’ contribution to the National Insurance respectively.  A further charge of 
EC$4.00 per ton of cargo handled is also included in the stevedoring charge.  
Containerised cargo incurs an additional stevedoring charge of EC$70.00 per TEU 
and EC$20.00 per TEU per move for full containers and empty containers 
respectively for restowing or landing containers during operations.  The total 
estimated onboard charges for the financial year 2000/2001 was approximately 
EC$7.2 million. 
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4.3  Value Added Services to the Cargo 
Value added services rendered to cargo at Port Castries consist of cargo processing, 
storage and information processing. However, SLASPA’s tariff is limited to that of 
cargo processing and storage. 
 
4.3.1  Cargo storage   
Storage at Port Castries is limited to that of short-term storage and consequently the 
charges for storage are penal.  Import and export cargo are allowed a free storage 
period of five days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and Public Holidays.  
Transhipment cargo is granted 21 free days and empty containers are allowed 30 
days free excluding the weekends and Public holidays as mentioned for import and 
export cargo.  Cargo stored in excess of the allotted time incurs a cost of EC$3.50 
per ton for the first two succeeding days directly following the free period.  This 
amount increases to EC$8.00 per ton for each succeeding three day period following 
21 days in excess of the free storage period.  Cargo stored in excess of three months 
at the port are placed on auction to recover the cost associated with the storage and 
also the recovery of any Customs duties that may be payable. 
 
4.3.2  Cargo processing 
SLASPA does not perform true cargo processing of the kind usually done in other 
ports.  Instead its processing is restricted to that of consolidation or deconsolidation 
(stuffing or unstuffing) of containers.  The applicable tariff for this service, which 
adds value to the cargo, is a charge of EC$15.00 per ton subject to a minimum 
charge of EC$150.00 per workday.  Given the increases in associated costs such as 
labour and equipment, the revenue earned from this activity partially covers the costs 
of providing this service.  The base charge as stipulated above represents only 8% of 
the average costs of stuffing or destuffing a 40-foot container.  Further, the average 
revenue earned of EC$480.00 for destuffing a 40-foot container (based upon 32 tons) 
represents approximately 25% of the average costs of doing so (estimated at 
EC$1891.00). 
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4.4  Other Services to Users 
Other value added services provided by SLASPA at Port Castries centres around 
leasing of warehouses and office spaces and the provision of security.  Currently, 
SLASPA provides 80,000 cubic feet of cold storage facilities which are leased to 
private companies.  As part of the leasing arrangements, SLASPA provides 
maintenance and security whilst the private operators are responsible for the payment 
of monthly rentals and utilities.  All leasing fees are negotiated but SLASPA ensures 
that the agreed monthly rentals adequately covers the costs associated with the 
general maintenance and security of these facilities. 
 
In 1996, SLASPA invested approximately EC$3 million and converted a cargo shed 
into a modern duty free shopping complex to service the in transit passengers 
onboard cruise ships.  The shops within this complex are leased to various private 
individuals and companies who pay SLASPA a monthly rental.  The negotiated 
leasing fees were calculated to recover the initial investment costs alongside other 
costs including maintenance, administration and security.  
 
The security service available at Port Castries is provided by a permanent department 
of Port Police existing within the SLASPA establishment.  Consequently, although 
SLASPA does not charge any user directly for its security services, the costs 
associated with the provision of this service are calculated and factored into other 
user charges.  Thus both the ship and cargo owner benefits and pays for security 
services provided by SLASPA. 
 
4.5  Other Port Activities 
SLASPA’s value chain at Port Castries includes other activities such as marketing 
and the development of its human resources.  However, although users benefit from 
these activities they nevertheless are not charged for the provision of theses services.  
For instance, the development of SLASPA’s human resources enables the users, both 
ship owners and cargo owners, to benefit from a more efficient workforce without 
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having to pay for it directly.  The necessary funding is acquired from a multitude of 
other tariff items, most of which were discussed above. 
 
4.6  General Discussion 
As one of many ports operating within the Caribbean region offering similar services, 
Port Castries’s ability to be financially self sustaining whilst remaining competitive 
hinges upon its tariff level and structure.  Whilst the relevant costs associated with 
the provision of specific services was difficult to extrapolate from the financial 
statements of SLASPA it was easily identified that revenue generated at the port 
allowed for a surplus of EC$16.5 million which was then used to defer loan charges, 
depreciation and relevant shares of general expenditure for the 2000/2001 financial 
year.  This resulted in a net operating surplus of EC$8.4 million for that year.  
Consequently, having identified the value chain at Port Castries and analysed the 
existing tariff structure in relation to the costs and revenue generating avenues, it 
appears that one of the areas available for revenue enhancement is that associated 
with its domestic (captive) cargo.   Whilst an entire tariff review is outside the 
purview of this paper, the application of cargo dues can be analysed in seeking to 
redress this situation.  As discussed in earlier chapters, UNCTAD proposes the use of 
a value-based tariff for the application of cargo dues (wharfage).  This may be 
particularly applicable to Port Castries whose revenue base for this tariff is slowly 
being eroded by the substitution of containerised cargo for break bulk.  As a result, 
an analysis into the possibility of amending the present tonnage based cargo dues to 
one calculated on the value of the cargo (especially that transported in containers) 
may offer an avenue for remedying the situation.   
 
 
 
 
 35
5 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPUTER BASED MODEL  
 
 
5.1  Identification Of The Wharfage Component Within The Container Charge 
As stated in earlier chapters, wharfage forms part of a unitary charge levied on 
containers passing through the Port of Castries with the exception of transhipment 
containers.  Consequently, the wharfage component has to be identified in order to 
allow further analysis regarding its conversion to a value-based format. 
 
The first step in seeking to disaggregate the wharfage component is to detail all the 
various components included within that unitary charge.  A review of the tariff 
schedule shows that the charge of EC$400/TEU for loaded containers and 
EC$100/TEU for empty containers includes both cargo handling and cargo dues 
(wharfage).  The inclusion of only these two charges allows for easier computation.   
 
5.1.1  Calculation Of Cargo Handling Costs 
Historically, costing of services provided at the Port of Castries is calculated on the 
average cost principle rather than the marginal cost method.  Consequently, this 
approach (average cost method) will be used in seeking to calculate the cargo-
handling component of the container charge.  Aside from this general assumption, 
other factors have to be considered.  Firstly, the average cost will be calculated over 
a four-hour work period since this time frame represents the minimum call-out 
period for stevedores hired by SLASPA.  Secondly, charges for use of the shore 
crane and other equipment used on board for cargo handling purposes is charged 
separately to the vessel.  (As explained earlier, SLASPA invoices the vessel for all 
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charges incurred at the Port with the exception of storage charges).  Thirdly, all 
stevedoring charges are applied separately. 
 
Following from this information the necessary second step is the identification of the 
personnel costs incurred by SLASPA on the dockside.  Table 5.1 below identifies the 
various personnel involved in the dockside operations and calculates the total costs 
incurred over the four-hour minimum period.   
 
Table 5.1 -  Personnel Costs Incurred Dockside 
Personnel Quantity Hourly rate
Cost for 4 Hr 
minimum 
Superintendent 1  $    24.00  $              96.00 
Berth & Shed Supervisor 1  $    17.69  $              70.76 
Tally Clerk 1  $      9.77  $              39.08 
Fantuzzi Operator (top lifter) 2  $    20.80  $            166.40 
Mechanic 2  $    13.53  $            108.24 
Crane Operator 1  $    20.80  $              83.20 
Transport Driver 1  $    10.64  $              42.56 
Foreman 1  $    38.09  $            152.36 
Terminal Labourer 2  $    18.71  $            149.68 
Total personnel costs 12    $            908.28 
 
Having calculated the personnel costs incurred in cargo handling dockside, the next 
step is the identification of the equipment utilized dockside together with their 
respective costs.  The hourly cost of equipment, obtained from SLASPA and used in 
the following calculations, was developed to include all costs such as fuel, 
maintenance (both routine and unplanned), labour (exclusive of the driver’s 
personnel cost), spare parts and depreciation expenses.  Consequently, Table 5.2 
below identifies and calculates the associated costs of the cargo handling equipment 
used within the four-hour minimum call-out period as discussed previously. 
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Table 5.2 – Equipment Costs Incurred Dockside 
Equipment Type Quantity Hourly cost
Cost for 4 Hr 
minimum 
Fantuzzi (top lifter) 2 $250.00 $2,000.00
Tug Truck 1 $250.00 $1,000.00
Total equipment cost 3   $3,000.00
 
Given these costs, the average cargo handling cost per TEU can then be calculated 
utilising the personnel and equipment costs calculated above in conjunction with the 
average productivity (estimated at 13 TEU per hour as provided by SLASPA) of the 
container gang.  The resultant calculation is provided below. 
 
Figure 5.1 - Calculation of Cargo Handling Cost per TEU 
Total personnel cost   908 
Total equipment costs 3000 
Total personnel and equipment costs 3908 
General administrative cost (10%)   391 
Total Handling cost over 4 hr minimum 4299 
 
Average productivity (TEU/ hr)    13 
Average TEUs handled in 4 hour period    52 
Estimated average cargo handling cost per TEU $82.68 
 
A review of Figure 5.1 above shows that a 10% administrative cost was calculated on 
the total of the personnel and equipment cost.  This added cost (expressed as a 
percentage) is used by SLASPA as a proxy to cover additional expenses incurred by 
other services provided by SLASPA that are not charged directly to the clients who 
benefit from these services.  Such services include security, marketing, engineering, 
accounting and general administrative services. 
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5.1.2  Identifying The Wharfage Charge 
Knowledge of the cargo handling charge is relevant but insufficient to estimate the 
wharfage component of the unitary charge levied on containers.  Given that SLASPA 
was unable to provide the relevant basis upon which the wharfage for containerised 
cargo was levied, it became necessary that an assumption be made regarding the 
basis of application of the wharfage component as it relates to containers.  This 
assumption was developed based upon an analysis of reasoning behind the 
application of any wharfage charge.   
 
From its definition, wharfage is a charge levied on cargo for use of the berth or wharf 
(Brodie, P. 1997).  This is interpreted to mean that any cargo passing over a wharf 
must bear a cost of using that wharf.  In the case of containerised cargo, the actual 
commodity that is passing over the wharf is a unitary box. These boxes are of 
standard measurements and the respective weights are strictly monitored and allowed 
to vary within previously established ranges.  This differs tremendously from what 
occurs with general cargo that varies in size, weight and packaging from one 
consignment to another.  However, the common element between the two cargo 
trades is that ‘weight,’ expressed as short tons in the case of Port Castries, is moved 
over the wharf or berth.  Given this commonality it can be argued that the container 
trade would be disadvantaged since the gross weight handled by the crane per box 
includes not only the weight of the cargo transported inside but the actual weight of 
the container itself.  This differs for general cargo because the weight handled per 
consignment for general cargo pertains mostly to the cargo itself with the minimal 
addition of the weight of the pallets used to transport the cargo.  The counter 
argument proposed is that the port should not excise the weight of the container since 
the actual container itself can be argued to represent cargo to the shipowner 
especially in the instance of the Port handling empty containers.  These empty 
containers can be classified as cargo belonging to the various shipping lines that use 
them.  This means that the gross weight of the container is relevant to the port since 
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it is that ‘weight’ that passes over the wharf.  Consequently, wharfage can be applied 
based on the gross weight of containers passing over the wharf or berth.  
 
Based on the above discussion of wharfage, the assumption made at this juncture is 
that wharfage for containers at Port Castries is applied similar to that of general 
cargo on ships over 100 GRT as stated in the Tariff of the Port and outlined in 
Chapter 3.  Using this assumption implies that EC$6 per short ton is charged to all 
containers both loaded and empty.  The suitability of this assumption is assessed 
using the estimated cargo handling costs in conjunction with the container charges. 
 
Use of the ISO standardized container weights (both empty and full) in conjunction 
with the assumed Wharfage charge of EC$6.00 per ton would allow the Port to 
calculate wharfage charges as indicated in the following table.  The ISO standardized 
container weight is used since SLASPA keeps a uniform charge on all containers 
regardless of their individual weights, which may vary when loaded. 
 
Table 5.3 – Estimation of Wharfage Charges per Container 
 
Container Description ISO Weight (Short Tons) Wharfage Charges 
20 ft empty 2.5 $15 
40 ft empty 5.5 $33 
20 ft loaded 26 $156 
40 ft loaded 34 $204 
 
To further justify our assumption regarding the basis and amount of the Wharfage 
(cargo dues) applied on containers, the average handling cost and the wharfage 
charges calculated above is analysed together with the container charges levied by 
SLASPA.  The results are illustrated in Table 5.4 below. 
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Table 5.4 – Comparison Of Container Charge With Cargo Handling And Cargo 
Dues 
 
Container 
description Charge 
Cargo 
handling 
cost Cargo dues Total cost Difference
20 ft empty  $       100   $         83  $             15  $            98   $              2 
40 ft empty  $       200   $       165  $             33  $         198   $              2 
20 ft loaded  $       400   $         83  $           156  $         239   $          161 
40 ft loaded  $       800   $       165  $           204  $         369   $          431 
 
The results of this analysis suggests that the assumption regarding the value and basis 
of the application of wharfage (cargo dues) on cargo transported in containers is a 
reasonable one, in that the container charge of EC$100 per TEU for empty containers 
and EC$400.00 per TEU for loaded containers allows SLASPA to recover the cargo 
handling costs and also the wharfage component whilst earning a profit.  A closer 
look at the results obtained above may cause one to question the apparent exorbitant 
level of profit achieved on the 40 ft loaded box.  However, it must be realised that the 
port is barely covering the cost associated with the empty containers and as discussed 
in the previous chapter, cross subsidies are required from certain services in order to 
compensate for the losses accruing by the port for other services rendered to the ports 
clients including those provided to the shipping lines.  Further, the low level of profit 
received on the empty boxes is consistent with the practise at SLASPA wherein the 
captive domestic cargo is responsible for the majority of revenues generated at the 
port.  Additional analysis was conducted using the four hour minimum call out 
period for the stevedores in order to ascertain the average costs and revenues 
obtained based upon the ratio of 20 and 40ft loaded and empty containers handled at 
the port.  The results and calculations are illustrated in Appendix B.  
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5.2  The Computer Model for Containerised Cargo 
In developing the model, sample data regarding the number of containers, type (LCL 
or FCL) and the respective CIF values of the cargoes transported within was 
collected from SLASPA and the Customs Department of Saint Lucia for the period 
January to March 2001.  This data was then sorted in descending order according to 
the CIF values.  In order to facilitate further manipulation and analysis of the data, a 
subjective decision was then taken as to the relevant grouping of the data into three 
distinct value groups.  Additionally, this action was taken since it was anticipated 
that the varying numbers, values and types (FCL, LCL) of containers occurring 
within the sample data would respond differently to price changes.  This reasoning is 
developed further in the following section on the estimation of price elasticities.  
Since the values sampled ranged from approximately EC$1,000 to EC$900,000 the 
data was then segregated into the following groups: 
Group A Less than EC$100,000 
Group B EC$100,000 to EC$200,000 
Group C Over EC$200,000 
These groupings were then analysed to determine the proportion of FCL to LCL 
containers contained within each group.  This information was deemed necessary in 
order to make an estimation of elasticity required for the model. 
 
5.2.1  Estimation of Elasticity 
In order to determine how the incidence of the value-based wharfage tariff would 
affect the trade of cargo in containers it was necessary that an estimation of the price 
elasticity of the container trade be calculated.  Without the luxury of time wherein 
the price (wharfage) could be fluctuated and the ensuing change in container trade 
could be measured, another method or proxy had to be developed to assist with the 
estimation of the price elasticity.   
 
The first step in this process was to determine who bears the incidence of the port 
charges.  A specific sampling of the shipping agents and the freight forwarders 
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operating in Saint Lucia was conducted using a questionnaire as illustrated in 
Appendix C.  The response to this questionnaire although only received from a very 
small sample indicated that all the port charges (including wharfage) were passed on 
to the shippers or consignees of the cargo.  This suggested that the trade in 
containerised cargo would be less elastic to price changes since the shipping lines did 
not have to bear the increase in costs.  Whilst this knowledge was very informative it 
nevertheless could not be incorporated into the model.  Consequently, an assumption 
was made using the knowledge obtained from the questionnaire and the 
corresponding number of consignees associated with FCL and LCL containers 
transiting the port.  From the data received it was realised that LCL containers have 
many consignees for the cargo transported within whereas FCL containers are 
usually consigned to one consignee.  In the situation of Port Castries, all LCL 
containers are destuffed at the port since none of the shipping lines or freight 
forwarders offer destuffing services outside of the port compound.  Consequently, it 
was generally assumed that traffic involving LCL containers would be less elastic to 
price changes than FCL containers since the increase in costs would be shared 
amongst many consignees of cargo within each box.   This increase in cost would 
probably represent a small cost per consignee as opposed to that borne by a single 
consignee of an FCL shipment.  This assumption regarding elasticity was then 
incorporated into the model.  Consequently, trade in containers was deemed to be 
price elastic if FCL containers within any group amounted to more than 60% of the 
total boxes handled in that group.  Conversely, the trade in containers was deemed to 
be price inelastic if the percentage of FCL containers was less than 60% of total 
boxes handled in that group.  For the purposes of calculations in the model, price 
elasticity was valued between 1 and infinity (1 < Ed < ∝).  Price inelasticity was 
valued between 0 and 1 (0 < Ed < 1).  This followed the convention of multiplying 
the formulae for price elasticity of demand by the number (-1), which nullifies the 
inverse relationship between price and quantity (Evans & Marlow 1990). 
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Following this logic, the elasticities for the container trades within each value group 
was subjectively estimated at (2) for the Group A with cargo below EC$100,000, 
(0.85) for Group B with cargo within the range EC$100,000 - EC$200,000 and (0.5) 
for Group C with cargo valued above EC$200,000.  The respective elasticities were 
chosen because FCL containers represented 64% of containers handled in Group A 
which suggested that the trade would be price elastic, Group B with an elasticity of 
0.85 was price inelastic since the FCL containers amounted to 35% of boxes handled 
whereas Group C was treated as more price inelastic with a value of 0.5 since FCL 
containers comprised only 25% of boxes handled. It must be noted that these 
elasticity values were subjectively assigned and as such field experiments would 
need to be conducted in order to ascertain their appropriateness. 
 
5.2.2  Determination of Base and Maximum Charge 
As explained in the introductory chapter to this thesis, the model for the application 
of the value-based tariff should propose both a minimum and a maximum charge 
within which the port may decide on the appropriate wharfage.  Thus the minimum 
charge would have to allow the port to cover the costs associated with the relevant 
charge.  Since wharfage is applied for use of the berth or quay, the minimum charge 
is calculated to cover the annual depreciation expense of the berths utilized.   The 
expected contribution per box is calculated using the estimated annual throughput of 
full containers handled at the berths together with the annual depreciation expense of 
the berths.  The final minimum wharfage charge, expressed as a percentage of the 
CIF value of the cargo transported in containers, is then calculated using the average 
CIF value of the cargo transported in all the containers sampled together with the 
expected contribution per box handled.   This method of determining the minimum 
charge is only applicable when the berths concerned are restricted to handling only 
containerised cargo.  In the instance of multi purpose berths handling both break bulk 
and containers the method has to be slightly modified but the principle remains the 
same.  The minimum wharfage charge should allow the port to recover the annual 
depreciation expense of the berths being utilised.  In order to accomplish this, the 
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respective total CIF values for break bulk cargo and containerised cargo must be 
calculated and expressed as percentages of their combined CIF value (i.e CIF value 
of break bulk plus CIF value of containerised cargo).  The annual berth depreciation 
expense is then allocated to the various cargo traffic based upon the respective 
percentages of the total value of break bulk and containerised cargo handled at the 
port or berth as explained earlier.  The minimum wharfage is then calculated as 
indicated above using this new figure. 
 
The maximum wharfage charge per box, expressed as a percentage of the CIF value 
of the cargo transported inside, is calculated to maximise total wharfage revenue 
given the estimate of elasticity for the particular container trade.  Thus, in instances 
of the trade being price elastic the wharfage revenue can only be maximised by 
reducing the tariff to an appropriate level wherein both trade and total revenue would 
be maximised.   Conversely, the model also allows for the maximisation of wharfage 
revenue for instances when the trade in containers is deemed to be price inelastic.  
The model also provides the relevant effect on quantity traded whenever elasticity or 
price is varied.  This task of maximising wharfage revenue is accomplished by use of 
the excel function ‘solver’ which allows the user to set the ‘wharfage revenue after 
price change’ to a maximum by varying the new price.  Further analysis including 
determining the ‘elasticity value’ that will enable the port to maximise revenue for a 
given price increase can be performed by the model through use of either the ‘goal 
seek’ or ‘solver’ function. 
 
In order to accomplish this task, certain assumptions gleaned from the sample data is 
utilised.  Firstly, the average CIF value per box is calculated for the various 
groupings of containers.  This average is then held constant for the future predictions 
of the model.  Herein lies a weakness that can be overcome by routinely updating the 
data collected for the containers over time.  Trends may be realised which would 
provide a more realistic approach to the prediction of the average CIF value of cargo 
transported in the containers.  Secondly, the average wharfage charged, expressed as 
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a percentage of the average CIF value of the box (as calculated above), is calculated 
using the existing wharfage charge to provide the model with the initial tariff from 
which to analyse the impact of price and resultant trade movements.  An illustration 
of the model is presented in Appendix D.  The overall results as obtained by the 
model are presented in the following table. 
 
Table 5.5 – Results Of Computer Model For Containerised Cargo 
Group A Group B Group C 
  
Less than 
100000 100000 - 200000
Greater than 
200000 
Estimated Elasticity 2 0.85 0.5 
Initial Traffic (Boxes) 25 20 8 
Average CIF value per box $            45,458 $          138,123 $          394,705 
Initial Wharfage Charge as % of 
average CIF value per box 0.37% 0.13% 0.05% 
Estimated initial wharfage 
revenue as predicted by model $              4,188 $              3,696 $              1,488 
Estimated maximum wharfage 
revenue as predicted by model $              4,712 $              3,720 $              1,674 
Difference $                 524 $                   24 $                 186 
Wharfage charge corresponding 
to maximised wharfage revenue 0.28% 0.15% 0.07% 
Predicted Traffic (Boxes) 38 19 6 
Initial wharfage revenue based on 
empirical data $              4,188 $              3,696 $              1,488 
Predicted wharfage revenue 
based on empirical data $              3,141 $              4,022 $              2,232 
Difference $             (1,047) $                 326 $                 744 
Minimum Wharfage as calculated 
by model 0.014% 0.014% 0.014% 
 
As illustrated in the table above, the total initial wharfage revenue based on the 
empirical data was calculated as EC$9372 as compared to that calculated based on 
the suggested maximum wharfage charge of EC$9395.  Although these figures only 
allow for an increase of EC$23 it should be noted that the Port would benefit from 
other revenue generating areas resulting from the increased trades.  The cargo-
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handling tariff is one such area that would allow the port to increase its overall 
revenue as it relates to the container trade.   
 
 
5.3  The Computer Model for Break Bulk Cargo 
Similar to the analysis conducted above for the container trade, basic parameters 
must be established prior to the actual analysis itself.  One such factor is the 
estimation of price elasticity.  In the absence of detailed analysis of price elasticity of 
break bulk cargo it is generally assumed that the trade is price elastic since the 
packages tend to belong to only one consignee who must bear the full cost of 
transiting or using the port.  Based on this assumption, the elasticity assigned to that 
of break bulk is (3) since it is assumed that the trade is more elastic than the 
container trade in Group A mentioned earlier.   
 
Another parameter that has to be established is an average CIF value per short ton of 
break bulk cargo handled at the port.  Similar to that devised for the container trade, 
this average CIF value per short ton of cargo is kept constant and used by the model 
in the future prediction of cargo trade and revenues.  As in the case of the container 
trade, this weakness can be rectified through continuous data collection and analysis 
in order to assist with the identification and prediction of any trends that would allow 
the model to be refined. 
 
The final two parameters for the development of the model include identification of 
the tonnages handled and the current wharfage charge.  The initial wharfage charge 
to be used by the model in the analysis of the impact on trade and adjustments in 
price is determined by expressing the estimated wharfage revenue collected over the 
sample period as a percentage of the total CIF value of the cargo analysed.  The 
tonnage handled is merely converted from kilograms to short tons which is the unit 
of measure used by the port. 
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5.3.1  Determination of Base and Maximum Charge 
The calculation of a minimum wharfage charge for break-bulk cargo is proposed to 
cover that portion of the berth depreciation expense, attributed to break-bulk cargo 
handling.  This base charge is calculated by expressing the allocated berth 
depreciation expense as a percentage of the estimated annual value of break-bulk 
cargo transiting the port.  Whilst the limitation of the data provided by the Customs 
department did not allow for the exact replication of this proposal, a base charge was 
developed for the period under review by extrapolating the depreciation expense for 
the same period as covered by the data provided.   
 
Having developed the model along the same lines as fashioned for the container trade, 
the maximum wharfage charge is determined by maximizing the wharfage revenue 
given the allocated elasticity for the trade.  This is achieved via use of the ‘solve’ 
function in Microsoft Excel in which the model is developed.  A curious scenario 
occurred when this wharfage charge was determined.  The model indicated that the 
minimum charge was higher than that proposed to maximise the wharfage revenue.  
Further analysis of this scenario is warranted but the inability to verify the 
information sourced from St. Lucia negated any further attempt.  Nevertheless, the 
model indicates that use of the minimum price as calculated would essentially stop 
all trade in break bulk cargo given the estimated price elasticity.  Alternatively, the 
wharfage revenue would be maximised at that price if the trade in break bulk cargo is 
inelastic i.e. having a value between zero and one.  An illustration of the model is 
appended as Appendix E. 
 
5.4  General Discussion of the Models 
Having developed the models a short discussion as to its relevance may be beneficial.  
The first and perhaps the most important factor in its use and further revision is the 
collection of accurate data for all cargoes transiting the port.  In the case of Port 
Castries, data on cargo that includes CIF values is not collected and analysed by 
SLASPA. In addition, information sharing with the Customs department is 
 48
conducted manually with numerous incidences of re-entering of information thereby 
contributing to human error.  This situation could be avoided if the port community 
was linked via one computerised system such as is done in larger ports like Aärhus in 
Denmark.   
Another area that needs further analysis but may constitute a thesis on its own is the 
estimation of price elasticities of the various cargo trades.  Whilst an attempt is made 
to circumvent this estimation as discussed earlier, the model would be better served 
with a more definitive calculation of price elasticity.  This would provide the port 
with a clearer indication of the response of their clients to the proposed changes in 
tariff.  The privilege of time will allow a port to vary the prices of its services and 
observe the resultant impacts on the various trades.  In doing so, extensive collection 
of data and observation of customer reactions will enable ports wishing to utilise this 
model to refine the aspect of price elasticities.  Nevertheless, operators of ports 
should have a fair understanding of their customers preferences that will enable them 
to estimate the elasticities required to be input into the model until more definitive 
information is obtained. 
 
As previously discussed, one of the fundamental assumptions of the model is the 
constant average CIF values of the various cargo trades.  Consequently, changes in 
the future CIF values of the cargo transported would significantly alter the actual 
outcome as compared with that proffered by the model.  Thus, whilst this method 
allows for some insight into future actions based upon suggested price changes and 
estimated elasticities it is recommended that the model be used as a tool to assist with 
the process of tariff setting rather than an actual predictor of price. 
 
In the current era faced by the maritime industry, ports are increasingly pressured to 
provide shipping lines with transparent costs and charges.  The argument offered is 
that shipping lines are better able to plan their journeys if all relevant costs are 
provided before hand.  Under this scrutiny, ports wishing to utilise this model for the 
determination and application of wharfage tariffs based on value may be faced with 
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some difficulty if the individual cargo trades are too segregated according to their 
respective elasticities.  In such circumstances, ports would be well advised to attempt 
to minimize the respective groupings occurring within any individual cargo trade. 
 
The model developed in this thesis can also be used to determine the wharfage to be 
applied on empty containers transiting the port over the berth.  The necessary 
information required for this model to be adapted is the estimation of the value 
afforded to the shipping line by handling the empty containers. In addition, the price 
elasticity for this trade will have to be determined.  Once this information is obtained 
the model can be used to provide Ports with an indication of the wharfage that can be 
charged in order to maximise their revenue. 
 
By using the model and implementing the various wharfage charges according to the 
respective groupings, it may be argued that the port is still distorting the value chains 
of the cargo and perhaps the ideal solution is the application of a uniform percentage 
charge to all cargo values.  Whilst this argument appears feasible it must be realised 
that the incidence of price elasticities on the respective cargoes plays an extremely 
critical role.  Consequently, the consideration for the application of any price 
changes has to take into account the ability of the cargo to absorb that price.  This 
ability is estimated through the use of elasticity calculations as utilised by the models. 
 
In general, the models developed in this thesis provides Ports with an estimation of 
the impacts of price changes on the various cargo trades and resultant revenues 
whilst taking the respective price elasticities into account.  In essence this gives Ports 
a good economic estimation of any suggested pricing changes. 
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6 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
Globalisation impacts on all facets of life including all aspects of trade and 
transportation.  Ports, as key players within the transportation chain are increasingly 
challenged to assist with the development of the various supply chains.  Although 
Ports have generally been slow to view themselves as integral members of these 
chains they have nevertheless contributed to the efficiency of these chains by 
reductions in delays for the transfer of cargo via the improvement of the port 
operating systems.  Central to this strategy is the use of computerised systems that 
enable the rapid processing of information regarding the cargoes transiting the port.  
Technological advances with regards to the port operating equipment such as gantry 
cranes and container handling equipment have also aided in this process. 
 
In recent times, increasing intensity of competition amongst ports have forced further 
self analysis and consequently ports have responded by reviewing their pricing 
systems and its impact on the supply chains.  This review has been complicated by 
the varied forms of ownership and resultant interests practised by ports around the 
world.  The services provided by ports are viewed at one extreme as serving the 
public good and as a result it is argued that the costs of providing the services should 
be borne through general taxation existing within the economy.  At the other extreme, 
ports are viewed as purely commercial entities that seek to recover the costs 
associated with the provision of services from the users and beneficiaries of their 
services and facilities (Strandenes & Marlow 2000).   
 
Given the increased attention to the pricing systems and strategies of ports, attempts 
have been made by agencies such as UNCTAD to provide ports with a method of 
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cost recovery and pricing strategy suitable to the varied forms of port ownership.  
Central to this proposal is the concept wherein the tariffs are developed based on 
three elements: 1. costs, to recover expenses incurred by the port in providing 
services and facilities; 2. utilization, to promote the better use of port assets; and 3. 
prices, structured on what the traffic can bear (UNCTAD 1995).  This approach is 
known as the Cost-Performance-Value approach (CPV).  Whilst UNCTAD has 
suggested that value-based pricing strategies can be applied to differentiated cargoes 
through broad definitions such as general cargo including break-bulk and 
containerised cargo, and dry and liquid bulk cargoes, ports facing a substitution 
effect of break-bulk cargo for containerised cargo may have difficulty in applying 
this strategy.  More specifically, as the trade in break-bulk cargo is replaced by that 
of containers, the port may have difficulty in developing the appropriate value based 
tariff for the cargo transported within the containers. 
 
In seeking to address this situation, this thesis proposes a computer based model 
which utilises the CIF value of the cargo transported in the containers and as break-
bulk in calculating and providing a range within which the port may apply a value 
based tariff such as wharfage.  The general assumption is that the CIF value of the 
cargo can be used as an approximation of the value provided to the respective owners 
of the cargo via the use of the port.  Owners of higher valued cargo are assumed to 
derive more value from use of the port’s services than those owners of lower valued 
cargo. 
 
Central to this model is the estimation of price elasticity as related to cargoes 
transported in containers and as break-bulk.  Without the privilege of an intensive 
study to ascertain the price elasticity of the various cargo trades, assumptions were 
developed along the lines of ownership of the cargo wherein it was assumed that 
single owners of a shipment (as occurs in FCL containers) would be more elastic to 
price changes than many consignees of cargoes transported within one container (as 
occurs in the LCL containers).  A similar assumption was made in the case of break-
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bulk cargo.  However, it must be borne in mind that the price elasticity can be 
influenced by other factors including the relative bargaining power of the individual 
clients and also the willingness of the shipping lines to incur higher costs on behalf 
of their shippers (these costs are recovered in full from their shippers in the case of 
Port Castries).  These factors would only be determined by a complete investigation 
into the relevant price elasticities of the different trades.  Nevertheless, given the 
limitations of the assumptions regarding elasticities, the estimations proposed by the 
model provide a substantive base upon which the model can be used. 
 
In conclusion, ports wishing to implement a value based wharfage tariff for cargoes 
transported in containers alongside that transported as break-bulk can use the model 
proposed in this thesis.  Whilst requiring some measure of subjective judgement in 
using the model, the results ensure that ports are provided with a range within which 
they may set the wharfage tariff.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
The port’s value chain 
 
SERVICES TO THE SHIP 
• Safe Navigation 
o Aids to navigation 
o Dredging 
o Pilotage, towage 
• Services at the Berth 
o Berthing 
o Stevedoring, wharf handling 
o Equipment, short-term rental 
o Water, bunkers, garbage removal 
o Electricity and communications 
o Stowage planning 
SERVICES TO THE CARGO 
• Cargo Processing, Storage 
o Storage, short-term 
o Storage, long-term 
o Processing to different form 
o Consolidation/deconsolidation 
o Equipment, short-term rental 
• Information Processing 
o Cargo inventory 
o Notification of vessel and cargo arrival 
o Cargo clearance 
OTHER SERVICES TO USERS 
• Leasing land, other resources 
o Office space 
o Warehouses 
o Equipment, long-term rental 
o Land for development 
o Land for operations 
• Security 
o Vessels 
o Cargo 
OTHER PORT ACTIVITIES 
• Marketing and Sales 
o Market analysis 
o Marketing activities 
• Human Resource Development 
o Training 
o Recruitment 
o Reorganization of work and gangs 
Source: UNCTAD (1995). Strategic port pricing 
APPENDIX  B
CALCULATION OF TOTAL COSTS AND REVENUES FOR MINIMUM CALL OUT PERIOD
Revenues
Average productivity of container berth (TEU/ hr) 13
Minimum call out time for personnel (hours) 4
Average quantity handled in call out period (TEU's) 52
Charge to ship for containers (per TEU)
Loaded 400.00$         
Empty 100.00$         
Ratio of loaded to total TEU's 53%
Ratio of empty to total TEU's 47%
Average number of loaded TEU's handled in period 27
Average number of empty TEU's handled in period 25
Average revenue earned during minimum call out period
Loaded 10,955$         
Empty 2,461$           
TOTAL AVERAGE REVENUE 13,417$        
Total personnel costs 908$              
Total equipment costs 3,000$           
Total 3,908$           
General administrative cost 10% 391$              
TOTAL SLASPA AVERAGE HANDLING COST 4,299$          
Estimated cargo handling cost per TEU 82.68$          
General weights of containers (short tons)
20 ft empty 2.5
40 ft empty 5.5
20 ft loaded 26
40 ft loaded 34
Cargo dues for containerised cargo paid in accordance with that detailed for general cargo
Cargo dues as per tariff (per short ton) 6$         
20 ft empty container 15$       
40 ft empty container 33$       
20 ft loaded container 156$     
40 ft loaded container 204$     
Comparison of container charge with cargo handling and cargo dues
Container description Charge
Cargo 
handling 
cost Cargo dues Total cost Difference
20 ft empty 100$      83$        15$                98$           2$             
40 ft empty 200$      165$      33$                198$         2$             
20 ft loaded 400$      83$        156$              239$         161$         
40 ft loaded 800$      165$     204$             369$        431$        
Breakdown of TEU's handled in four hour period
Percentage of 20 ft empty 45%
Percentage of 40 ft empty 55%
Percentage of 20 ft loaded 46%
Percentage of 40 ft loaded 54%
Number of 20 ft empty units handled (expressed in TEU's) 11
Number of 40 ft empty units handled (expressed in TEU's) 14
Number of 20 ft loaded units handled (expressed in TEU's) 13
Number of 40 ft loaded units handled (expressed in TEU's) 14
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APPENDIX  B
Calculation of total revenues and costs incurred for a minimum call out period
Container Description
TEU's 
Handled
Revenue 
(per TEU) Total Revenue
Cargo 
Handling 
cost
Cargo 
Dues Total Cost Difference
20 ft empty 11 100 1,108$           916$         166$         1,083$      26$           
40 ft empty 14 100 1,353$           1,118$      223$         1,342$      11$           
20 ft loaded 13 400 5,042$           1,042$      1,966$      3,008$      2,033$      
40 ft loaded 14 400 5,600$           1,157$      1,428$      2,585$      3,015$      
TOTALS 51 13,103$        4,234$     3,784$     8,018$      5,085$     
57
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APPENDIX C 
 
Questions for Shipping Agents and Freight Forwarders 
 
1. Is the container handling charge at Port Castries taken into consideration when the 
freight rate is being established? 
YES   NO   (If response is No then go to question 4) 
 
2. If ‘YES’, what percentage of the container handling charge is factored into the 
freight rate quoted to shippers? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Is the remaining percentage of the container handling charge quoted to the shippers 
directly or is it shared between the line and the shipper?  
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Are shippers billed separately for the entire container handling costs? 
YES    NO 
 
5. If ‘NO’, how is the container handling cost recovered? 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Is the container handling charge recovered differently in the case of LCL containers?  
(If ‘YES’ please explain) 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. If the consignees are billed separately for the container handling charges, then how 
are the charges allocated amongst the various consignees within LCL containers? 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Questions 1 – 3 above relate specifically to the Shipping Agents who would be in a 
position to determine or assist with establishing freight rates to St. Lucia.  Since most of 
the freight forwarders do not set freight rates, then only questions 4 – 7 would apply to 
them. 
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APPENDIX C 
(Response) 
Questions for Shipping Agents and Freight Forwarders 
 
8. Is the container handling charge at Port Castries taken into consideration when the 
freight rate is being established? 
YES    NO   (If response is No then go to question 4) 
 
9. If ‘YES’, what percentage of the container handling charge is factored into the 
freight rate quoted to shippers? 
 
      100% per container 
 
10. Is the remaining percentage of the container handling charge quoted to the shippers 
directly or is it shared between the line and the shipper?  
 
N/A 
 
11. Are shippers billed separately for the entire container handling costs? 
YES    NO 
 
12. If ‘NO’, how is the container handling cost recovered? 
As I said its included in the freight as part of what is called the LS&D 
 
13. Is the container handling charge recovered differently in the case of LCL containers?  
(If ‘YES’ please explain) 
__________________No__________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. If the consignees are billed separately for the container handling charges, then how 
are the charges allocated amongst the various consignees within LCL containers? 
 
Normally the NVOCC pays the freight of which  there is a separate rate for billing 
those various consignees within the LCL containers. 
 
Questions 1 – 3 above relate specifically to the Shipping Agents who would be in a 
position to determine or assist with establishing freight rates to St. Lucia.  Since most of 
the freight forwarders do not set freight rates, then only questions 4 – 7 would apply to 
them. 
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APPENDIX C 
(Response) 
Questions for Shipping Agents and Freight Forwarders 
 
15. Is the container handling charge at Port Castries taken into consideration when the 
freight rate is being established? 
YES    NO   (If response is No then go to question 4) 
 
16. If ‘YES’, what percentage of the container handling charge is factored into the 
freight rate quoted to shippers? 
 
Full container handling is incorporated 
 
17. Is the remaining percentage of the container handling charge quoted to the shippers 
directly or is it shared between the line and the shipper?  
 
N/A 
 
18. Are shippers billed separately for the entire container handling costs? 
YES    NO 
 
19. If ‘NO’, how is the container handling cost recovered? 
It is included in the freight  
 
20. Is the container handling charge recovered differently in the case of LCL containers?  
(If ‘YES’ please explain) 
__________________No__________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. If the consignees are billed separately for the container handling charges, then how 
are the charges allocated amongst the various consignees within LCL containers? 
 
Handling charges (LS&D) are included in all costs except when signed to 
consignee’s account 
 
Questions 1 – 3 above relate specifically to the Shipping Agents who would be in a 
position to determine or assist with establishing freight rates to St. Lucia.  Since most of 
the freight forwarders do not set freight rates, then only questions 4 – 7 would apply to 
them. 
 
APPENDIX D
Analysis of Cargo transported in containers (January - March 2001
Consignment 
Type
Size of 
Box CIF Value
Current 
wharfage 
Charge
Wharfage 
as % of CIF 
Value
New 
Wharfage 
Charge
Proposed 
Wharfage 
as % of 
CIF Value
Difference 
between new 
and current 
charge
Difference 
in grouping 
total
LCL 20 1440 156 10.83% 4 0.28% -152
FCL 20 9087 156 1.72% 25 -131
FCL 20 11532 156 1.35% 32 -124
FCL 20 13563 156 1.15% 37 -119
FCL 40 15001 204 1.36% 41 -163
FCL 20 16342 156 0.95% 45 -111
FCL 40 18121 204 1.13% 50 -154
LCL 20 19497 156 0.80% 54 -102
FCL 20 23150 156 0.67% 64 -92
LCL 20 23578 156 0.66% 65 -91
FCL 20 30004 156 0.52% 83 -73
FCL 20 43780 156 0.36% 121 -35
FCL 40 48180 204 0.42% 133 -71
LCL 20 52726 156 0.30% 146 -10
LCL 20 54315 156 0.29% 150 -6
LCL 40 58250 204 0.35% 161 -43
LCL 20 59795 156 0.26% 165 9
LCL 40 62322 204 0.33% 172 -32
FCL 20 63120 156 0.25% 174 18
FCL 20 76701 156 0.20% 212 56
LCL 20 78926 156 0.20% 218 62
FCL 40 87315 204 0.23% 241 37
FCL 20 87531 156 0.18% 242 86
FCL 20 90113 156 0.17% 249 93
FCL 20 92059 156 0.17% 254 4188 3141 98 -1047
LCL 20 100493 156 0.16% 146 0.15% -10
FCL 20 105315 156 0.15% 153 -3
LCL 40 107931 204 0.19% 157 -47
LCL 40 108799 204 0.19% 158 -46
LCL 40 109521 204 0.19% 159 -45
FCL 40 109531 204 0.19% 159 -45
LCL 20 111832 156 0.14% 163 7
LCL 20 115480 156 0.14% 168 12
FCL 40 119320 204 0.17% 174 -30
LCL 40 120116 204 0.17% 175 -29
LCL 40 135446 204 0.15% 197 -7
FCL 40 140080 204 0.15% 204 0
LCL 20 143102 156 0.11% 208 52
LCL 20 152533 156 0.10% 222 66
FCL 20 171113 156 0.09% 249 93
LCL 40 173232 204 0.12% 252 48
FCL 40 179530 204 0.11% 261 57
LCL 20 180829 156 0.09% 263 107
FCL 40 185118 204 0.11% 270 66
LCL 40 193135 204 0.11% 281 3696 4022 77 326
FCL 40 209735 204 0.10% 148 0.07% -56
FCL 40 215139 204 0.09% 152 -52
LCL 40 226511 204 0.09% 160 -44
LCL 20 228843 156 0.07% 162 6
LCL 20 360629 156 0.04% 255 99
LCL 20 472191 156 0.03% 334 178
LCL 40 548670 204 0.04% 388 184
LCL 40 895922 204 0.02% 633 1488 2232 429 744
TOTAL 53 9372 9395 23
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Minimum value 1,440$          
Maximum value 895,922$      GROUP A
Boxes Percent
Number of entries below: 100,000.00$ 25 Normal wharfage charge:
Breakdown of boxes within range 20' 156
20 ft 19 76% 40' 204
40 ft 6 24%
LCL 9 36% 20' 2964
FCL 16 64% 40' 1224
Total wharfage collected at present charge 4188
Average wharfage per box 168
45458
Average wharfage as % of CIF per box 0.37%
Price
Quantity 
(boxes) Elasticity Elastic
0.0037 25 2 0.28%
0.0028 38 178481
9357
133142
% change in price -0.25 0.0143%
% change in demand 0.500000009
New demand 38
45458
1136448
4188
1704672
4712 Maximised
GROUP B
Boxes Percent
Number of entries within 100,000$      200,000$      20 Normal wharfage charge:
Breakdown of boxes within range 20' 156
20 ft 8 40% 40' 204
40 ft 12 60%
LCL 13 65% 20' 1248
FCL 7 35% 40' 2448
Total wharfage collected at present charge 3696
Price
Quantity 
(boxes) Elasticity Average wharfage per box 185
0.0013 20 0.85 138123
0.0015 19 Average wharfage as % of CIF per box 0.13%
Inelastic
0.15%
% change in price 0.088235294
% change in demand -0.075
New demand 19
138123
2762458
3696
2555273
3720 Maximised
Boxes Percent
Number of entries above 200,000$      8 GROUP C
Breakdown of boxes within range
20 ft 3 38% Normal wharfage charge:
40 ft 5 63% 20' 156
LCL 6 75% 40' 204
FCL 2 25%
20' 468
Price Quantity Elasticity 40' 1020
0.0005 8 0.5 Total wharfage collected at present charge 1488
0.0007 6 Average wharfage per box 186
394705
0.05%
% change in price 0.499999997 Inelastic
% change in demand -0.25 0.07%
New demand 6
394705
3157641
1488
2368230
1674 MaximisedWharfage revenue after price increase
Average CIF per box
Total CIF of cargo handled in containers
Wharfage at start
Total CIF of cargo after price increase
Wharfage currently collected for Group A
Average CIF per box
Total CIF of cargo handled in containers
Wharfage at start
Average CIF value per box handled in range
Total CIF of cargo after price change
Wharfage revenue after price change
Wharfage currently collected for Group B
Estimation of elasticity
Suggested Max Wharfage charge
Annual berth depreciation
Total full boxes handled for period
Average value per box handled annually
Suggested Min Wharfage charge
Estimation of elasticity
Average CIF value per box handled in range
Suggested Max Wharfage charge
Average CIF per box
Total CIF of cargo handled in containers
Wharfage at start
Total CIF of cargo after price increase
Wharfage revenue after price increase
Suggested Max Wharfage charge
Wharfage currently collected for Group B
Average CIF value per box handled in range
Average wharfage as % of CIF per box
Estimation of elasticity
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